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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TRAVIS B. DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 20000433-CA
vs.
ELIZABETH ANNE
CHRISTENSEN,fleaELIZABETH
ANNE DAVIS,

Oral Argument Priority 4

Defendant-Appellee.
SANDY THORNOCK and
GEORGE T. THORNOCK,
Interveners-Appellees.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(h) (1998).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Does a parental presumption apply in a custody dispute between

a parent and the grandparents where the grandparents were previously awarded
custody by the final divorce decree between the parents? Custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 Utah
Ct. App. 2901f 21, 989 P.2d 491, 497. The trial court abuses its discretion if

its decision is based on an erroneous legal conclusion. Lund v. Brown, 2000
UT751J9, llP.3d277,279.
2.

Did the evidence support the trial court's findings that the

parental presumption was rebutted? Findings will not be reversed unless
clearly erroneous. Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
3.

Was a parent's "fundamental liberty interest" in the custody of

his child affected by a ruling which merely left in force a custody order to
which the parent had stipulated? "Constitutional issues, including that of due
process, are questions of law which we review for correctness." J.N, v. State
(State ex rel. J.N.I 2000 UT Ct. App. 73 ^ 13, 997 P.2d 345, 348.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Appellees do not contend that there are any constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is determinative
of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final order in a

domestic relations matter.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. This appeal

arises out of two consolidated domestic relations actions. The first, Case No.
944400298, was filed by Elizabeth Davis against Travis Davis on February 3,
2

1994, and sought a decree of divorce or decree of separate maintenance. (R.
198-195.l) Travis Davis ("Father") moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction because the mother had not been a resident of the county for
three months prior to filing the complaint. (R. 211-208.) The trial court ruled
that the divorce claim would be dismissed, but the claim for separate
maintenance would remain. (R. 293-292.)
On August 10, 1994, the maternal grandparents, Sandy and George
Thornock, intervened in the separate maintenance action, alleging that Kory
had resided with them for nearly a year and seeking custody of Kory. (R. 291 288.) Mother and Father subsequently stipulated that the separate maintenance suit between them could be dismissed with prejudice, but that the custody
suit between Father and Thornocks would remain. (R. 314-313.)

The trial

court later awarded temporary custody of Kory to Thornocks. (R. 331-327.)
Two years later, on August 28, 1996, Father filed his complaint for
divorce against mother, Case No. 964401886. (R. 3-1.) The complaint
alleged, in paragraph 5, that the child was in the custody of the Thornocks and
they should be awarded custody. By stipulation, a Decree of Divorce was

Contrary to the instruction of Utah R. App. P. 11(b)(1)(C), the papers in
the record are organized in reverse chronological order. The result is that the
page numbering on each document appears in reverse order.
3

entered March 4, 1997, awarding custody of Kory to the Thornocks. (R. 2523.)
On October 9, 1997, Father filed a petition to modify the Decree of
Divorce and to award him custody (R. 39-26), and also filed a motion to
consolidate the two actions. (R. 41-40.) The trial court consolidated the
actions. (R. 42, 55-53.) The court also ordered that custody remain with
Thornocks during the pendency of the action. (Id.)
The case was tried to the bench on September 29, 1999. At the
beginning of the trial, with the concurrence of counsel, the Court spent
significant time talking with Kory in chambers, without counsel present. (Tr.
(R. 368) 3; R. 109-108.) The only other testimony was from Lynn Jacobson,
who had been appointed by the court as a custody evaluator. (R. 91-90.)
Father cross-examined Mr. Jacobson concerning his recommendation that
custody be awarded to Thornocks (Tr. 5-62) but declined to present additional
witnesses on the issue of custody (Tr. 67-68). The court thereafter issued its
ruling from the bench finding the custody issues in favor of the Thornocks.
(Tr. 68-91.) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 178-171) and a
Final Order (R. 181-179) were entered on April 25, 2000. Father filed his
Notice of Appeal on May 22, 2000. (R. 184.)

4

C.

Statement of Facts. As explained in more detail in Point III of

this brief, many of the assertions in Father's Statement of Facts are not
supported by the evidence presented at the trial court. A response to the
unsupported factual assertions made by Father is contained in that Point, rather
than in this Statement of Facts. The only evidence presented at trial was the
child custody evaluation prepared by Lynn Jacobson ("evaluation," copy
attached to Father's brief), the addendum to that evaluation ("addendum," copy
attached to Father's brief), and Father's cross-examination of Mr. Jacobson at
trial.
Kory Lynn Davis was born September 24, 1992, to Travis and
Elizabeth Davis. (Evaluation 1.) At the time of Kory's birth, Mother was
living with her parents, the Thornocks, and Father was in Spain. (Evaluation
3.) Father returned from a tour of duty with the Navy when Kory was about
three months old, and Mother and Father moved with Kory to California.
(Evaluation 3.) When Kory was about 10 months old, Father left for a tour of
duty in Guam. (Evaluation 3.) In about November, 1993, Kory began living
with Thornocks in Utah. (Evaluation 5; see also R. 214-213.) At the time,
Kory was just over one year old. He has resided in the Thornock home ever
since. (Evaluation 5.) Mother and Father divorced in 1997, when Kory was

5

four, and stipulated that custody of Kory be awarded to Thornocks, subject to
reasonable visitation to Father. (R. 25-23.)
Father asserted that Thornocks interfered with his visitation rights.
(Evaluation 4.) Thornocks asserted that they had not denied visitation to
Father except when Kory was sick or when he has failed to give reasonable
advance notice of visitation. They asserted that visitation has been difficult,
but they have made every effort to comply with the court's order. (Evaluation
5.) Mr. Jacobson noted the conflict (Evaluation 12, 14), and stated that it was
his opinion that Thornocks could have made a greater effort to accommodate
visitation by Father. (Tr. 41.) Mr. Jacobson nonetheless testified that he did
not detect in the Thornocks any attempt to deny Kory access to his father. (Tr.
19.)
In addition to interviewing Father and Thornocks, Mr. Jacobson also
interviewed five additional persons, which included Father's wife, ex-wife,
mother, father, and step-mother. (Evaluation 2.) With the exception of
Father's mother and his wife (the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother),
the other collateral contacts supported leaving custody with the Thornocks.
The paternal grandfather and step-grandmother insisted that Father continues
to be irresponsible and immature. They told the evaluator that Father had
abandoned his son in favor of a girlfriend overseas. (Evaluation 9.)
6

Father asserted that he was not able to care for Kory because of his
military service overseas. Father told the evaluator that "he tried repeatedly
to obtain a hardship release but was denied." (Evaluation 11.) The evaluator
concluded, however, that "Travis could have obtained a hardship' discharge
from the military if he had requested one." (Addendum 1.) The evaluator
noted that "[t]here is some indication that he volunteered for overseas duty to
continue a relationship with a girlfriend." (Evaluation 13.) He testified
without objection that obtaining a hardship discharge would be a "relatively
simple thing." (Tr. 40.) Father elected to not testify at trial and did not
present any other evidence concerning this issue. (Tr. 67-68.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The parties and the court apparently agreed at trial that the parental
presumption applied, but they were in error. Father had lost custody earlier
when he stipulated that Thornocks have custody; the parental presumption
therefore no longer applied. Because this Court will affirm on any proper
ground, the Court should hold that the parental presumption did not apply and
that the trial court's decision was correct because leaving custody with the
Thornocks clearly was in the child's best interest.
Even if the parental presumption did apply, the trial court's findings
rebutting the presumption are not clearly erroneous. The custody evaluation
7

provided competent, admissible evidence that there was no strong mutual bond
between Father and the child, that Father had not sacrificed his interests for
those of his son, and that Father generally lacked the sympathy for and
understanding of his son which was consistent with parents generally.
Although present at trial and granted the opportunity to testify, Father elected
to present no evidence responding to the evaluator's opinion.

Evidence

supporting the findings was also given in the trial court's in camera interview
of the child. Because Father did not request that the interview be part of the
record, this Court must presume the child's testimony supports the trial court's
findings.
Father's claim of a due process violation is raised for the first time on
appeal, and should not be considered. There was, nonetheless, no constitutional issue because the trial court did not "deprive" Father of custody. The
trial court simply left custody as Father had initially stipulated it should be.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION DID NOT APPLY
BECAUSE THE PARENTS HAD ALREADY RELINQUISHED
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD.
The trial court held that the parental presumption applied in this case
but it had been rebutted. Point II of this brief shows that the trial court's
8

findings, rebutting the parental presumption, are fully supported by the
evidence. This Court need not, however, address the sufficiency of the
evidence issue. Thomocks respectfully submit that the trial court was wrong
in applying the parental presumption in the first place. It is well established
that a trial court's decision will be affirmed on any proper ground, even if the
trial court assigned another reason for its ruling. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC
Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Because Thomocks (the maternal
grandparents) had previously been granted custody by a final order which was
not appealed, the parental presumption did not apply in this case.
Father emphasizes that Thomocks did not appeal the trial court's
conclusion that the parental presumption was in place and needed to be
rebutted. (Brief of Appellant 13, 19.) Thomocks did not, however, need to
cross appeal in order to challenge the trial court's rationale, because Thomocks
do not seek any affirmative relief. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Construction,
Inc., 1999 UT 69, f 7, 983 P.2d 575, 578 (appellee may attack the trial judge's
rejection of their arguments so long as they do not seek affirmative relief);
Halladav v. Cluff 739 P.2d 643, 645 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (If a party
"only wants the judgment affirmed, he should not cross appeal") Thomocks
want to have the trial court's decree affirmed in all respects. No cross appeal
was necessary.
9

In Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court recognized a presumption in favor of a natural parent:
In a controversy over custody, the
paramount consideration is the best interests of
the child, but where one party to the controversy
is a nonparent, there is a presumption in favor of
the natural parent. This presumption recognizes
the natural right and authority of the parent to the
child's custody. It is rooted in the common
experience of mankind, which teaches that parent
and child normally share a strong attachment or
bond for each other, that a natural parent will
normally sacrifice personal interest and welfare
for the child's benefit, and that a natural parent is
normally more sympathetic and understanding
and better able to win the confidence and love of
the child than anyone else.
649 P.2d at 40 (citations, quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that H[t]he
affection of a grandparent can safely be said to be no less in depth than
parental affection." Tuckev v. Tuckey. 649 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1982).
In Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh. 745 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1987), the Supreme
Court further explained:

"The presumption favoring natural parents is

analogous to the presumption favoring an existing custody arrangement. Like
the natural-parent presumption, the existing-placement presumption is based
on the assumption that it will normally serve the best interest of the child."
745 P.2d at 1251. Accordingly, the parental presumption evaporates, and the
10

existing-placement presumption controls, where the parents have previously
lost custody. L.A.W. v. State (State ex rel M.W.V 970 P.2d 284, 288 (Utah
Ct. App. 19981 citing K.V. v. S.V. (State ex rel H.R.V\ 906 P.2d 913, 917
(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

Once lost, the parental presumption cannot be

reasserted at a later date unless custody has since been restored to the parent.
H.R.V., 906 P.2d at 917; Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d 888, 892 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996).
Thornocks were granted custody by a Decree of Divorce2 entered
March 4, 1997, two and a half years before the trial in this matter. (R. 25-23.)
At the time of that decree, Thornocks had already had physical custody of

2

Father asserts that the custody awarded to Thornocks in the Decree of
Divorce was somehow temporary, because Thornocks were not parties to the
divorce action at that time. (Brief of Appellant at 5.) Father does not,
however provide any analysis of this claim, and this Court should decline to
consider it. Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). If the
Court were to reach the merits of the argument, the argument should be
rejected. Although the temporary custody granted to Thornocks under the
1994 separate maintenance action may have been the practical reason why
Mother and Father both stipulated to leave custody with the Thornocks, it does
not change the fact that the divorce decree awarded custody to Thornocks
outright, with no indication that the custody was temporary or otherwise
limited. The findings supporting the decree assert that awarding custody to
Thornocks was in Koryfs best interest. The decree was a final order and was
not challenged. Whatever may have been the parents' motivation, the fact
remains that Thornocks were granted permanent custody and the parents,
including Father, voluntarily relinquished custody. This is sufficient to
eliminate any parental presumption.
11

Kory for approximately three and a half years, ever since Kory was about one
year old.
The common experience ofmankind would teach that grandparents who
had cared for a child for at least six years, since he was one year old, would
be more likely to have a strong bond with the child, to sacrifice for the child,
and to understand the child than would a father, however loving, who had
voluntarily relinquished custody and who had only recently reasserted a desire
to have custody. The sole purpose of the parental presumption is to serve the
best interest of the child. Where, as here, the parents have voluntarily
relinquished custody, the existing-custody presumption should prevail over
any parental presumption.

This Court should hold that the parental

presumption did not apply in this case.
There was no dispute in the evidence that the best interest of Kory
would be served by maintaining the existing custody arrangement with his
maternal grandparents.

The custody evaluator, Lynn Jacobson, strongly

recommended that Thornocks retain custody.

No other evidence was

presented at trial. This Court should hold that although the trial court erred in
applying the parental presumption, the result reached by the court was correct
and should be affirmed.

12

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE REBUTTED THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION.
Hutchison gave the following guidelines for rebutting the parental
presumption:
Consistent with its rationale, the parental
presumption can be rebutted only by evidence
establishing that a particular parent at a particular
time generally lacks all three of the characteristics
that give rise to the presumption: that no strong
mutual bond exists, that the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own
interests and welfare for the child's, and that the
parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding
of the child that is characteristic of parents generally.
649P.2dat41.
In evaluating whether these factors have been satisfied, the Court must
bear in mind that Hutchison only required proof that a particular parent
"generally" lacks the characteristics. "Obviously, a 'general' lack is not an
absolute lack. Thus, the standard articulated in Hutchison is somewhat
flexible." Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Utah 1997), accord
R.S. v. State (State ex rel J.M.V 940 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); K.V.
v. S.V. (State ex rel H.R.V.\ 906 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Relying on In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 857 (Utah 1981), Father argues
that the evidence rebutting the Hutchison factors must be clear and convincing.
13

Cooper v. DeLand 652 P.2d 907 (Utah 1982), however, explains that the
Castillo clear and convincing standard only applies in termination cases. The
Hutchison factors may be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence.
The trial court made explicit factual findings rebutting each of the
Hutchison factors. To challenge those findings, Father was required to "(1)
marshal all of the evidence that supports the finding, and (2) demonstrate that,
despite the evidence, the finding is so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of evidence and thus, clearly erroneous." JJvl, 940 P.2d at 531
(citations and quotation marks omitted). A review of the evidence in this case
shows that (1) Father has failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the
findings, and (2) there is ample support in the evidence for the findings.
A preliminary observation is that much of the evidence in this case was
not made part of the record. With the consent of all parties, the Court spent
a substantial amount of time interviewing Kory in chambers. The trial court
emphasized the importance of that visit: "Those comments represent my
evaluation of the case based upon the evidence as it has been received, based
upon the reports that have been considered by me and read by counsel, based
upon my consultation with counsel and most importantly, based upon my
opportunity to talk with Cory [sic]." (Tr. 81 (underlining added).)

14

Of course, it is well established that in the absence of a complete record
on appeal, the appellate court must presume that the omitted evidence
supported the findings. Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Ct. App.),
cert, denied 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Father had a right to require that the
conference between the trial court and Kory be reported. Austad v. Austad.
2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284, 291 (1954); Briggs v. Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281,
282-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Although as a matter of orderly procedure the
court's interview with [Kory] in chambers should have been made of record,
appellant's acquiescence in the approach employed by the trial court precludes
him from assailing that approach on appeal." Bake v. Bake. 772 P.2d 461,465
n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
A.

There was no strong mutual bond.

The trial court found:
As to the three Hutchison factors, the Court finds
that there is not a strong mutual bond existing
now or in the past between the Petitioner and the
child. This has been true for a number of years
while Mr. Davis was away and his son has been
in the United States. Kory loves his father and
recognizes Travis as his father and Elizabeth as
his mother. He sees Sandy and George Thornock
as Grandpa and Grandma, and sometimes as Mom
and Dad. He is only 7 but he has demonstrated
the ability to perceive differences in relationships
between all four people. He does not have a
strong mutual bond with his father. A strong
mutual bond would be necessary to take him out
15

of the situation he is in now. Historically, and
presently, it does not exist.
(R. 176.)
This finding was supported by the report of Mr. Jacobson: "Travis has
a strong bond with his son and Kory recognizes Travis as his father. Kory's
parent/child bond is with the Thornocks who are the only people he has ever
know [sic] as parents. He enjoys visiting with his father but his 'home1 is with
the Thomocks." (Addendum 1-2.) Thus, Mr. Jacobson found a strong bond
from father to Kory, but only recognition from Kory to father. The bonding
was not mutual.
It is apparent from the trial court's oral ruling that he also relied heavily
on his interview with Kory in determining the strength of the Father/child
bond. (Tr. 75.)
Father complains that the findings do not specifically address each of
the arguments Father made below. Although findings must contain necessary
detail, "it is not necessary that a court resolve all conflicting evidentiary
issues." Sorenson v. Beers. 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980). The findings here
fully explain the court's reasoning. Father was gone, and Kory was raised by
his maternal grandparents. He has understandably bonded more closely to the
individuals who have raised him. The findings are very adequate to explain
how the court reached its conclusion.
16

Relying on Duncan v. Howard 918 P.2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1996),
Father also complains that the trial court did not address the effect of the
Thornock's claimed interference with Father's visitation rights.

Duncan,

however, only mentioned the claim of interference with visitation as one item
of evidence which supported the trial court's finding that there was a strong
mutual bond. Duncan does not require consideration of that factor in all cases.
More importantly, there is no "evidence" in this case of any visitation
interference. Mr. Jacobson noted the claims of each party, but nonetheless
concluded that there was no strong mutual bond. Father had the opportunity
to testify on the subject himself but elected not to. The trial court certainly
cannot be faulted for failing to make specific findings on the impact of the
supposed interference with visitation, when Father elected to present no
evidence on the topic.
B.

Father did not demonstrate his willingness to sacrifice his

interest for the child's.
The trial court specifically found:
The Court finds that the father has not
demonstrated that he has a tendency to sacrifice
his personal interest and welfare for the child's
benefit. A total consideration of the historical
information, as indicated in the child custody
evaluation, and in consultation with the child has
to be looked at to address this. The Court
indicates that Mr. Davis did not demonstrate a
17

willingness to sacrifice his own interest for the
needs of the child. Travis made little or no concerted effort to contest the Court's initial decision
to award custody of Koiy to Mr. and Mrs.
Thornock. Travis then voluntarily gave custody
to the grandparents.
(R. 176-175.)
The court's finding is similar in wording to the statement of Mr.
Jacobson in the addendum to the evaluation. Mr. Jacobson noted: "Travis
does not appear to have been willing to sacrifice his own welfare for that of
Kory during Kory's very early formative years. Travis was content to continue
his military career with full knowledge that Kory was in the capable care of
his maternal grandparents." (Addendum 2.) Mr. Jacobson also testified that
the information available to him showed that obtaining a hardship release
would have been relatively simple for Father.

(Tr. 40.)

The paternal

grandfather stated to Mr. Jacobson that Father had "abandoned his son in favor
of a girlfriend in Spain." (Evaluation 9 (Thornocks believe the girlfriend was
in Guam, not Spain).) This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's
finding.
Again, Father complains about the trial court's failure to consider
several of his arguments (Brief of Appellant at 26), but fails to mention that
Father was present at trial but elected to present no evidence supporting these
arguments. Even though the matter before the trial court was Father's petition
18

to modify the custody award, Father now argues that it was Thornocks' duty
to present all of the evidence. Thornocks did present the custody evaluation
and its addendum, which was considered by the court without objection from
any party. (Tr. 62-63.) This evidence was sufficient to establish their case.
Having established a prima facie case, Thornocks did not have the obligation
to go further and rebut Father's anticipated arguments where Father presented
no evidence to support those arguments.
Father also claims on appeal that Mr. Jacobson did not have the
requisite credentials to do a psychological analysis (Brief of Appellant at 27
n.3), but it was Father who had suggested Mr. Jacobson as a custody evaluator.
(R. 82-81.) There is no question that Mr. Jacobson possessed the qualifications necessary to make a custody evaluation. (Tr. 9.) The fact that he may
not have performed all the technical tests or possessed all the degrees which
Father, in hindsight, believed he should have might affect the weight given to
his testimony, but not its admissibility. Father never objected to the court's
consideration of the evaluation and cannot raise the issue for the first time on
appeal.
C.

Father lacked sympathy for and understanding of the child that

is characteristic of parents generally.
The trial court found:
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Thirdly, the Court finds that the father lacks a tendency to be more sympathetic and understanding
of the child than anyone else. Kory needs a
relationship with his father, mother, and grandparents, but most of all, Kory needs to know
where he belongs. His mental and emotional
well-being depend on that. The father's actions
have spoken louder than words to the child, and
the child does not feel the father is understanding
of his needs. The child needs time to be convinced that his father loves him. The child wants
association with the father but does not want to
live with his father. The child needs assurance
that when he is through visiting, he will be
coming back home. The child does not receive
that assurance.
(R. 175.)
In evaluating this finding, it is important to remember that while
Hutchison requires that the court focus on the three central characteristics, "the
purpose of the presumption—furthering the best interests of the child—is in no
way advanced by requiring a formulaic statement of the trial court's conclusions regarding those characteristics." Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d at 1252. The
evidence on sympathy and understanding is similar to the evidence on
bonding. The evaluator found that Father was bonded with the son, the but
son was not closely bonded with Father. Similarly, it is evident that Father
voluntarily relinquished custody of Kory when having custody did not fit with
Father's choice of military lifestyle. Later, when Father decided that Father
now wanted to have full-time custody of Kory, Father brought a petition to
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modify. The focus was always on Father's circumstances and not on what
would be best for Kory.
The trial court also relied heavily on Kory's testimony during the
interview in chambers:
Cory [sic] doesn't feel that he knows his father
very well. Cory [sic] understands that people tell
him that his father loves him. He says his dad
tells him that, he says Sandy tells him that, that
his dad loves him; but right now, at seven, actions
-as the saying-as the saying goes, have spoken
louder than words and he needs time to be able to
absorb and see and to be convinced that you love
him. Saying and doing are two different things."
(Tr. 77-78.)
Kory's in camera testimony that he doesn't know his father nor
recognize his father's love for him is remarkably similar to the language of
Hutchison: "[A] natural parent is normally more sympathetic and understanding and better able to win the confidence and love of the child than anyone
else." 649 P.2d at 40 (italics added). The testimony provides ample support
for the finding that Father lacked the necessary understanding of and sympathy
for Kory.
Father also challenges the perceived inconsistency between the Father's
current improved relationship with Kory and his prior lack of a meaningful
relationship. Whereas Hutchison requires proof that a parent lack the three
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factors "at a particular time," Father would apparently focus only on the time
of trial. That is not consistent with the purpose of Hutchison. Hutchison
merely recognizes the common experience of mankind that parents generally
care for children more than nonparents; therefore, the best interests of a child
will generally be served by awarding custody to a parent over a nonparent.
When that common experience of mankind does not hold true, i.e., when the
presumption has been rebutted, the presumption vanishes and the court
determines the best interests of the child without a presumption in favor of the
parent. If there exists any point in a child's life when he has bonded more
closely to his grandparents than to his parent and where the other Hutchison
factors have been met, thereafter the only focus should be on the best interests
of the child, rather than focusing on a rigid parental presumption which no
longer holds true in that situation.
POINT III
FATHER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
The only evidence in this case was the custody evaluation and its
addendum prepared by Lynn Jacobson and Lynn Jacobson's testimony at trial.
Father's Statement of Facts and other sections of his brief, however, make
numerous assertions which are not supported by the evidence. For example,
Father asserts that he became Kory's primary caretaker during the year after
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Kory's birth. (Brief of Appellant at 6.) The cited support for this statement is
a declaration of Father which was attached to a California divorce pleading,
which in turn was attached to Father's answer to the complaint in the 1994
separate maintenance suit. Although the document appears in the court file,
it was not admitted into evidence. See Massey v. Haupt 632 P.2d 824, 826
(Utah 1981) (admissions must be introduced into evidence before a party can
rely on them at trial).
On page 7 of his brief, Father asserts that he "repeatedly made
unsuccessful applications for hardship discharge in order to care for Kory."
The citation is to the custody evaluation's report of Father's statements to the
evaluator.

Father ignores the opposing testimony that Father chose to

volunteer for overseas duty in order to be with his girlfriend.
Father also asserts that "[a] significant factor in the denial of those
applications was that Kory was not then in Father's physical custody." (Brief
of Appellant at 7.) Although Father cites to the child custody addendum as
support for this statement, nothing in the addendum provides support. There
is no evidence in the record to support this statement. Similarly unsupported
are the statements concerning Father's attempts to visit with Kory and the
claimed interference by Thornocks. The brief contains details not found in the
evaluation and which are not supported by the record.
23

On page 26 of his brief, Father criticizes the trial court for failing to
give any weight to "Father's early lawsuits in both California and Utah in
which he, an impoverished seaman, attempted to gain custody of his son." He
further claims that the court "ignored Father's circumstances at the time with
respect to his deployment by the U.S. Navy and the fact that Father was not
able to take physical custody of Kory at the time in question." No testimony
at trial, however, supported these claims. There are references to these claims
in Mr. Jacobson's evaluation, but the evaluation also contains statements
opposing Father's factual claims. The trial court had no obligation to consider
the claims where Father had presented no evidence to support the claims.
Similarly, Father claims the Court "ignored the conduct of the
Thornocks in obstructing visitation between Father and Koiy, which led Father
to agree to custody in order that he might obtain court-ordered visitation."
(Brief of Appellant 26.) No evidence in the record supports this incredible
claim that Father gave up custody just to get visitation. The record is to the
contrary. Father's divorce complaint alleges that it would be in Kory's best
interest for Thornocks to be awarded custody. (R. 13 If 5.)
More examples could be given to show that Father is attempting to rely
on statements favoring him gleaned from sources other than the trial.
Particularly where Father voluntarily declined to provide any testimony at
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trial, Father should not be permitted to prejudice this Court on appeal by his
unsupported claims that Thornocks interfered with visitation.
POINT IV
FATHER MAY NOT RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
In Point F of his brief, Father asserts a constitutional due process claim.
No such claim was raised below, and Father is precluded from raising it for the
first time on appeal. Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
In any event, there is no constitutional issue here. Father voluntarily
stipulated that Thornocks have custody of Kory. He has now apparently
changed his mind and wants to regain custody. There is no state policy which
is depriving a father of custody. Rather, Father already gave up custody, and
the only issue is whether the best interests of the child are now served by
modifying that prior decree.

CONCLUSION
The trial evidence uniformly and strongly showed that Kory's best
interest would be served by leaving custody with Thornocks. There was no
parental presumption because Father had previously relinquished custody.
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Even if there was a presumption, it was rebutted, and Father presented no
contrary evidence. The decision of the trial court, leaving Kory in the custody
of his loving grandparents where he has been since he was one year old,
should be affirmed.
DATED this £ ± ? d a y of February, 2001.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, fo^
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellees

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were
mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this ^ ^
Linda Quinton-Burr, Esq.
Lisabeth Joner, Esq.
Ascione, Joner & Burr
42 North University Ave., Suite 205
Provo, UT 84606

J:\LWS\THORNOCK.BRF

26

day of February, 2001.

